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BOOK REVIEW
BRIGHT LINES
GEORGE D. BROWN*
THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER. By Martin H.
Redish. Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1991. Pp. viii & 192.
I. THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER-OVERVIEW
Martin Redish's The Federal Courts in the Political Order is an
important contribution to the field of federal jurisdiction. Professor
Redish begins by drawing upon principles of American political theory.
He argues that by examining those principles, we can broaden our
understanding of federal jurisdictional doctrines in much the same way
that constitutional law scholars have broadened the study of consti-
tutional law. For Professor Redish, the traditional questions of "if and
when a federal court is to adjudicate an issue of constitutional or federal
law"2 bring into play questions of political theory every bit as much
as do the substantive outcomes a court may ultimately reach. Other
federal courts scholars have directed considerable attention to the link-
age between jurisdictional doctrines and constitutional law. They have
repeatedly made the points that restrictive federal courts law can serve
as the vehicle for producing restrictive substantive doctrine,3 and that
narrow views of the role of the federal courts clash sharply with the
Warren Court vision of expansive constitutional law.4 These are not
the issues on which Redish focuses. Instead of focusing on substantive
outcomes, Professor Redish's goal is to illuminate the adjudicatory
function of the federal courts by developing and applying principles
that underlie our entire constitutional system.
Redish's analysis rests on two such principles. The first, the "rep-
resentational principle," 5 flows from the American system's emphasis
on popular sovereignty and political accountability. The principle pos-
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School.
1. Louis and Harriet Ancel Professor of Law and Public Policy, Northwestern
University.
2. M. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER 3 (1991) [her-
einafter THE FEDERAL COURTS] (emphasis in original).
3. E.g., Wells, Is Disparity a Problem?, 22 GA. L. REV. 283 (1988).
4. See Amar, Book Review, 102 HARV. L. REV. 688, 702-06 (1989) (discussing
tension between desegregation cases and classic view of federal courts).
5. THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 2, at 9-10.
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its that "[b]asic policy judgments not derived from constitutional text
or structure are, for the most part, to be made by the representative
branches of government."' 6 The second, the "counter-majoritarian prin-
ciple,"7 focuses on the fact that ours is a constitutional democracy and
that constitutional limits, to be meaningful, must be enforceable. Re-
dish writes that "(t)he concept of a formalized, written counter-ma-
joritarian constitution logically requires, for its continued viability, in-
terpretation and enforcement by some governmental organ
independent of the majoritarian branches." 8 Redish is not the first to
write about the problem caused by the coexistence of the two principles.
The tension between them is the subject of much modern writing about
the legitimacy of judicial review.9 Where this book is particularly help-
ful is in applying that tension to questions about the jurisdiction of the
federal courts in both their constitutional and nonconstitutional roles.
Redish's analysis leads him to recommend substantial, even "dras-
tic,' 1° alterations in jurisdictional rules governing both domains.
Redish begins his analysis in the nonconstitutional area. For him,
the representational principle should dominate the structuring of the
federal courts' role here. His particular focus is on the fashioning of
federal common law and on judicially-developed abstention doctrines.
He would eliminate the extensive body ofjudge-made law in both areas.
Federal common law and abstention are illegitimate, a "usurpation"' "I
of the basic policymaking function from the accountable political
branches by the "unrepresentative and unaccountable federal judici-
ary.""2 It is important to note, as I shall develop below, that Redish
reaches this conclusion largely because Congress has already acted
within these two areas. His sweeping conclusion of invalidity therefore
rests more on textual analysis than on the basic institutional principles
which he purports to examine.' 3 Even so, the clear message of the first
half of the book is that the structural imperative of the representational
principle dictates a decidedly subordinate role for the federal courts.
When, however, the book turns in its second half to an analysis
of the courts' role as constitutional adjudicators, a very different picture
emerges; the counter-majoritarian principle comes into play and "dic-
tates a moral and political obligation on the judiciary to provide a
6. Id. at 9.
7. Id. at 75-76.
8. Id. at 75.
9. E.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980).
10. THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 2, at 85; see also id. at 4 (analysis "should
dramatically alter existing jurisdictional doctrine").
11. Id. at 9.
12. Id.
13. See infra notes 50-59, 91-95 and accompanying text.
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forum for adjudication of constitutional claims."' 14 The Constitution
requires an enforcement organ. That organ must not be reluctant to
exercise its power, even though enforcement will frequently strike down
policy choices made by the same political branches whose capacity and
legitimacy are exalted under the representational principle. Again, Re-
dish proposes a drastic alteration in existing caselaw-what he refers
to as "Supreme Court jurisdictional doctrines that have dangerously
undermined or ignored the judiciary's essential role in our constitu-
tional system."' 15 The major changes he emphasizes are elimination of
the injury-in-fact component of the standing inquiry' 6 and rejection of
any "political question" doctrine.' 7
It is apparent from this brief summary that Redish's analysis of
the federal courts makes them sound almost like two totally distinct
institutions. The image of mild-mannered Clark Kent entering a phone
booth to emerge as Superman comes to mind. When the representa-
tional principle is in force the "unrepresentative and unaccountable
federal judiciary"' 8 must stay within its bounds since "representatives
elected by the people are more likely to reflect the public will than are
unelected dictators, regardless of how benevolent such dictators might
be."' 9 In fashioning federal common law, the federal courts have ig-
nored these restraints and engaged in "a form of judicial civil diso-
bedience to legislative will."20 Redish's rhetoric about the courts' role
in the nonconstitutional area could come from a floor speech by Senator
Jesse Helms on what is wrong with the Supreme Court. Senator Helms,
of course, would almost certainly be criticizing the Court for going too
far in some aspect of constitutional adjudication. In this domain, how-
ever, Redish waxes eloquent about the need for expansive judicial
power. He argues that "if the Court is to perform the essential function
of protector against a lawless government, it must draw the final con-
stitutional calculus." 2' Redish's problem with the Supreme Court in
this area is that its self-imposed limitations prevent it from going far
enough.
Redish's analysis therefore raises an initial question and reser-
vation: can a single institution perform in such a schizophrenic man-
ner? Is it not more likely, for example, that the constant deference
Redish calls for in the nonconstitutional area would spill over into
constitutional decisions in both substantive doctrines favoring the po-
14. THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 2, at 75.
15. Id. at 85.
16. Id. at 88-103.
17. Id. at 111-36.
18. Id. at 9.
19. Id. at 16.
20. Id. at 37.
21. Id. at 135.
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litical branches and threshold doctrines evincing a reluctance to get
involved at all? On a more general level, much of the book is premised
on the possibility, if not the necessity, of drawing bright lines between
aspects of the judicial function and with respect to separation of powers
generally. Redish cites with approval the Supreme Court's decision in
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha,22 a case in which
the Court's approach to separation of powers was at its strict, formalist
zenith. Other, more recent cases show a considerably more relaxed
approach to separation of powers issues23 and, in the Court's words, a
movement away from "bright line" rules.24 Redish does not discuss
them although, as I shall argue below, they are relevant to his abstention
argument and may well undermine it.
Redish's analysis also runs counter to the concept of federal ad-
judication as an essentially unitary process, a position that has been
advocated by a number of federal courts scholars.25 According to these
writers, common law decisionmaking, statutory interpretation and con-
stitutional adjudication are essentially similar exercises. Each contains
an inescapable component of judicial policy formulation; yet legislative
sources (including the Constitution) play a significant role across the
spectrum of judicial activity. 26 Redish, on the other hand, seeks to
compartmentalize the judicial process. Thus, he emphasizes "the fact
that usually the differences between common law and statutory inter-
pretation are, both conceptually and politically, qualitatively dis-
tinct." 27 At times, however, he comes close to acknowledging the ar-
tificiality of such sharp distinctions. 2
There is one more bright line argument that plays an important
role in the book's overall analysis: Redish views the statutes that govern
general federal question jurisdiction,29 enforcement of civil rights30 and
rules of decision in federal courts3' as so clear and dispositive that they
leave no room for doctrines such as federal common law and absten-
tion.32 The legislature has spoken; the courts must follow. Indeed, Re-
22. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
23. See generally Brown, When Federalism and Separation of Powers Collide-Re-
thinking Younger Abstention, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 114, 126-28 (1990).
24. Thomas v. Union Carbide, 473 U.S. 568, 586 (1985).
25. E.g., Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CH. L. REv.
1, 5-6 (1985).
26. See Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U.L. REV. 805, 834-36 (1989).
27. THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 2, at 32.
28. Id. at 62 (Court's development of extensive body of law under section 1983
"does not purport to be purely judge-made law, but rather assumes the democratically pro-
tective mantel of statutory interpretation").
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1986).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1986); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1986).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1986).
32. THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 2, at 29-74.
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dish relies so heavily on the dispositive nature of the statutory answers
that he leaves the reader in considerable uncertainty as to whether basic
institutional considerations would, by themselves, yield the answers he
puts forth.
In sum, Redish offers both a challenging look at a number of
significant doctrines affecting the federal courts and a call for wholesale
change. Much of the analysis rests on what I have referred to as bright
line 'assumptions. If one accepts the assumptions, the conclusions may
well follow. Most readers, I suspect, will find the lines blurred and
indistinct, at least some of the time. The issue then becomes how helpful
the book's analysis is in answering what turn out to be (or, more pre-
cisely, to remain) hard questions about the nature and role of the federal
courts.
This Review will focus on the federal courts portion of The Federal
Courts in the Political Order. The federal courts portion comprises more
than one half of the book and contains, I believe, its most challenging
material. Specifically, Parts II and III of this Review center on Redish's
treatment of federal common law and abstention. These are areas in
which Redish stands somewhat alone. In Part IV, I put forth the con-
clusion that Redish is at his strongest in forcing us to ask basic questions
about the legitimacy of judicial doctrine and the controlling force of
relevant statutes. The fact that I am not persuaded by his answers
detracts only somewhat from the value of the endeavor. Part V is a
brief section about the book's treatment of constitutional adjudication,
included primarily to link constitutional adjudication with the subjects
reviewed in Parts II and III. This Review's final section, Part VI, dis-
cusses a number of omissions from the book, especially recent judicial
developments. Redish drew his book from several of his many law
review articles.33 Perhaps he and the publishers worked on the principle
of "why gild the lily?" Still, I note in this part that discussion of some
recent decisions of the Supreme Court would have enriched the book,
especially because there are themes in those cases that are similar to,
perhaps even influenced by, the writings of Martin Redish.
II. REDISH'S CRITIQUE OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW
After positing and developing the "representational principle," 34
Redish applies it first to the power of the federal courts to fashion
common law.35 Strictly speaking, the validity of federal common law
is not a matter concerning the jurisdiction of the federal courts. It has,
33. See id. at vii (citing articles).
34. Id. at 9-10.
35. Id. at 29-46.
1991:293
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
however, been treated as closely related. The justification is that because
the federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, a generalized ex-
ercise of lawmaking must be guarded against because it would amount
to a de facto enlargement of jurisdiction. 36
An examination of any federal courts casebook will demonstrate, 37
however, that not only is there plenty of federal common law around,
but there is also pressure to create more. Yet questions persist as to its
legitimacy. 38 The Court has largely ignored these questions.39 Among
commentators, however, three somewhat distinct views have emerged.
At one end of the spectrum stands Professor Redish. As discussed
below,40 he argues that virtually all federal common law is illegitimate.
Most analysts stand somewhere near the midpoint of the spectrum,
viewing some, but not all, forms of federal common law as valid.4"
This "special" common law might, for example, be limited to enclaves
of particular federal concern. 42 Once the genie is out of the bottle,
however, fixing meaningful limits is no easy task. Thus, under a third
view, all federal common law is valid.
Redish is certainly correct in treating the legitimacy of federal
common law as an important issue.43 It goes to the heart of the role
of the federal courts as lawmaking bodies. It also can be seen as the
private law dimension of the question whether federal courts, as op-
posed to the state courts, are to be in the forefront of addressing im-
portant social issues. In this respect, Redish's discussion of the Agent
Orange litigation 44 is particularly relevant. One question that Redish
fails to address in his analysis is why the federal courts are somehow
different from the state courts in their authority to create common law.
Both court systems are constructed in accordance with similar consti-
tutional precepts; yet state courts obviously and without question func-
tion as common law courts. Limited governmental powers do, in
theory, differentiate the national government from those of the states,
but the concept of limited powers itself does not explain why the federal
courts cannot function as common law courts within the national
sphere.
The difficulty in justifying distinctions between the two court sys-
tems may lead to an expansive view of the federal courts: federal courts
36. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730-31 (1979) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
37. E.g., M. REDISH, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 484-
564 (2d ed. 1989).
38. In re"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980). See Merrill,
supra note 25, at 7-8 (discussing inconsistent statements by Supreme Court).
39. THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 2, at 29.
40. See infra text accompanying notes 51-60.
41. See Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARv. L.
REV. 883, 883, 885 (1986).
42. See id. at 911-12.
43. See Field, supra note 41, at 883-90 (discussing general problem of legitimacy).
44. THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 2, at 42-44.
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are federal counterparts to the common law courts of the states. Pro-
fessor Weinberg has strongly advocated this position, writing in part
in response to Redish's position at the opposite pole.45 For Weinberg,
"our courts are, and must be, courts of coordinate powers. The judiciary
must have presumptive power to adjudicate whatever the legislature
and the executive can act upon."4 6 The contrast between these polar
positions held by Weinberg and Redish can be seen in their different
treatment of the Agent Orange litigation.47 In this litigation, a federal
court of appeals refused to fashion federal common law that would
govern claims for injuries by Vietnam veterans. Weinberg finds refusal
to make federal law in such circumstances "irresponsible." 48 Redish
concedes the strong arguments for a federal rule, but argues that the
federal courts lacked power to fashion it in that specific instance,4 9 just
as they lack power to develop federal common law as a general matter.
Redish finds the prohibition in the Rules of Decision Act.50 That
statute provides as follows:
The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution
or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in
civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where
they apply.5"
For Redish the statute means what it says. What it says is that
state law governs cases in federal courts unless there is a federal law
on point that comes from a source other than the federal courts. The
statute is both a directive to the federal courts and a limitation on
them. Its historical purpose was to protect state interests by allowing
state law to be displaced primarily through acts of Congress, the body
in which state interests are considered and protected. 52 The statute
serves important, "inextricably intertwined" 53 values of federalism.
Fairly read, it bars virtually all forms of federal common law, such as
those involving federal proprietary interests, 54 foreign relations, 55 and
the implication of private damage remedies from federal statutes.56
Judicially created nonstatutory federal law is valid if Congress can be
45. Weinberg, supra note 26, at 805-07.
46. Id. at 813.
47. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980).
48. Weinberg, supra note 26, at 842.
49. THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 2, at 43.
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1986).
51. Id.
52. THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 2, at 35-36.
53. Id. at 31.
54. E.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
55. E.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
56. E.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
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said to have delegated to the federal courts the power to make it.57
Delegated lawmaking falls under the statute's exceptions for cases "pro-
vide[d]" for by Act of Congress. 8 Most federal common law, however,
represents "free-standing substantive common law principles, ' 59 and
the Rules of Decision Act prohibits it.
If Redish is right about the Act, how can there possibly be so much
federal common law on the books? As noted, Supreme Court decisions
do not provide much of a clue. In the 1988 decision in Boyle v. United
Technologies Corporation,60 the Court split sharply over whether to
allow a federal common law defense to a state tort action against a
military contractor. The point of contention was how close this fact
pattern was to cases involving the rights and duties of the United States
and cases granting immunity to federal officials sued under state law.61
The applicability of federal common law to these areas was well es-
tablished in previous decisions. Neither side explained why the Rules
of Decisions Act was not applicable to this case, or to the earlier cases,
for that matter. 62
Academic analysts vary widely in reconciling the Act's existence
with that of a large body of federal common law. Some admit that it
is a serious problem. 63 Professor Weinberg, on the other hand, argues
essentially that we ought to forget about the Act. 64 For her, it is "a relic
of a prepositivist, prerealist time, with scant relevance for us today.",65
Another, more common, academic approach is to fit federal common
law within the Act's exception for cases "where ... Acts of Congress
... require or provide. ... " Professor Peter Westen and Jeffrey Lehman
take this approach, arguing that because federal common law and sta-
tutory construction are essentially identical, the Act should be read as,
in effect, explicitly authorizing both forms of judicial activity.66 The
Act may also be satisfied by other statutory authority, such as federal
jurisdiction statutes.67 'Alternatively, it can be argued that federal stat-
utes on a particular subject matter constitute an authorization for the
57. THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 2, at 33-34.
58. Id. at 34.
59. Id. at 43.
60. 108 S. Ct. 2510 (1988).
61. See id. at 2514-15 (discussing areas of "uniquely federal interests").
62. See Weinberg, supra note 26, at 848-49 (discussing Boyle).
63. See Merrill, supra note 25, at 26-32.
64. See generally Weinberg, The Curious Notion that the Rules of Decision Act Blocks
Supreme Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U.L. REV. 860 (1989).
65. Id. at 866; see also id. at 867 (Act "simply without any modem meaning").
66. Westen & Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH.
L. REV. 311, 388 (1980); Westen, After "Life for Erie"--A Reply, 78 MICH. L. REV. 971, 983
(1980).
67. See Weinberg, supra note 26, at 832.
Bright Lines
federal courts to deal with that subject by filling in the statutory scheme
with federal common law.68
Redish recognizes and discusses these objections to his absolutist
reliance on the Rules of Decision Act. 69 His general criticism is that
they render the Act a nullity,7" or that they "strain the concept of
'statutory interpretation' to the linguistic and conceptual breaking point
by characterizing the unabashed exercise of judicial lawmaking power
as falling within the ,category of 'interpretation' every time a court can
find a statute even remotely relevant to the problem at hand."'"
Redish may be right that these efforts are less than convincing.
Even so, the Rules of Decision Act does not constitute the unambig-
uous, bright line support for his position that he contends. It provides
that state laws are the rules of decision, with certain exceptions, in cases
"where they apply." 72 Professor Weinberg suggests that this statutory
language is a tautology,73 an assertion that Redish views as part of her
general dismissive attitude toward the Act.74
Let us, however, follow Redish down the road of insisting that the
Act makes sense, and controls, in its entirety. Take another look at the
relevant text:
The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution
or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in
civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where
they apply.
I have emphasized the last five words to highlight the problem
they pose. Without these five words the statute would mean that state
law applies in all cases except those covered by federal nonjudicial law.
This is exactly the way Redish reads it. However, these five words are
in the Act, and he insists that it makes sense as a whole. The most
logical way to read them is that the draftsman contemplated cases in
which the rules of decision would come neither from state law nor from
the federal sources listed. The obvious candidate is federal common
law. Of course, the Act provides no guidance as to when this law would
be "applied." Perhaps the Supreme Court is to fashion criteria based
on the presence of a strong national interest, or the structural logic of
the federal system. A similar view is, in fact, a justification for much
existing federal common law,7 5 and reconciles it with the statute.
68. See Field, supra note 41, at 887, 927-30.
69. THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 2, at 31-42.
70. Id. at 32.
71. Id. at 36.
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1986).
73. Weinberg, supra note 26, at 816.
74. THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 2, at 156 n.26.
75. See, e.g., Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2514.
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I am certainly not the first to see room to maneuver in the Rules
of Decision Act, and I do not contend that the suggested construction
of "Where they apply" is compelling. It does, however, make more sense
than Redish's rather forced reading of these words. He views them as
a choice-of-law authorization, vesting "in the interpreting court the
power to decide which state laws 'apply' to which cases."' 76 This power
seems inherent in the Act's previous directive that state laws are the
general rules of decision. Thus Redish offers a reading which makes
the language superfluous.
My main point is not to encourage an endless debate over "where
they apply," but to demonstrate that an advocate of literalism, such as
Redish, will inevitably have problems giving the phrase crystal clear
meaning. What if one concludes, under one of the arguments given
above or by some other route, that the Act is not dispositive as to the
legitimacy of federal common law? It is on this point that I think Redish
comes up short. He stakes everything on the purported command of
the Act, and tells us very little about what basic constitutional principles
would dictate apart from it. He discusses federalism and separation of
powers, but only as aids to construction of this particular statute.
Remember that in the book, Redish promises to explore "the in-
stitutional appropriateness of the entire enterprise of federal common
lawmaking."77 Although he hints at underlying constitutional issues, 78
Redish is able to finesse them because of the happenstance of the Rules
of Decision Act. He notes the Supreme Court's cryptic statement that
the Act is "merely declaratory of what would in any event have gov-
erned the federal courts," '7 9 but does not explore the constitutional
ramifications of the statement or the problem. What is the inherent
lawmaking power of the federal courts? If it is somehow limited by the
Constitution, do those limits come from explicit text such as article III
or the tenth amendment, or from broader structural principles such as
separation of powers and federalism? Does Erie8° answer these ques-
tions? Redish suggests in a sentence that it does, 8' but does not elab-
orate. He does not answer them because the Rules of Decision Act
constitutes a bright line that obviates the necessity for that task. A full
understanding of the federal courts in the political order seems to call
for something more.
76. THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 2, at 156 n.26.
77. Id. at 29.
78. Id. at 35, 37.
79. Id. at"157 n.27.
80. Erie Ry. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
81. THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 2, at 29.
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III. REDISH'S CRITIQUE OF ABSTENTION
After disposing of the federal common law, Redish turns to doc-
trines of federal court abstention.8 2 These are judge-made doctrines
under which a federal court declines to hear cases over which it has
jurisdiction. The doctrines are triggered by various factors, but the
overall themes are respect for the competence of state courts and a
desire not to interfere with their functions. The doctrines work in dif-
fering ways.83 The federal plaintiff may be sent to the state court system
to try the entire case,84 may be sent there for the state portion only,85
or may be required to remain in state litigation already pending.8 6
Under Pullman abstention the plaintiff may return to the federal trial
court if federal questions remain, but abstention generally results in
trial in the state system with federal review in the Supreme Court or,
for criminal defendants, in federal district court on habeas corpus.
Federal court abstention has long been controversial. 7 The most
disputed form is Younger abstention. 8 It is probably also the most
significant both in terms of cases affected and, at the doctrinal level,
as an example of the federal courts law developed by the current court.8 9
Under Younger, a federal court must abstain if state court proceedings
are pending, the federal plaintiff is a party to those proceedings and
can raise the federal question, the state courts can hear this question
fully and fairly, and the federal court can identify an important state
interest in the litigation. 90 Younger cases present a clash of important
values in the federal system. The federal plaintiff generally sues under
section 1983,91 the basic civil rights statute, and generally asserts con-
stitutional claims. On the other hand, that same plaintiff is often a
party in state enforcement proceedings and is asking the federal court
to disrupt those proceedings. The problem presented by Younger is
how to reconcile individual and systemic claims given a nonunitary
court system in which both sets of courts are empowered to hear federal
claims. On a more general level, all of the abstention doctrines flow
82. Id. at 47-74.
83. See generally, C. WRIGHT, THE LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS 302-30 (4th ed. 1983).
84. See id. at 308-11.
85. See id. at 303-07.
86. See id. at 322-30.
87. See, e.g., id. at 305-07 (discussing Pullman abstention).
88. The doctrine derives its name from Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
89. See Levit, The Caseload Conundrum, Constitutional Restraint and the Manip-
ulation of Jurisdiction, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321, 336 (1989) (stating that Younger is
broadest of the abstention theories). But see THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 2, at 49
(Pullman is best known type of abstention).
90. See C. Wright, supra note 83, at 323-30.
91. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1986).
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from the problem of broad, overlapping jurisdiction between the two
systems.
Redish believes that all forms of abstention are illegitimate, par-
ticularly if the federal plaintiff presents a civil rights claim. As with
making federal common law, he finds that Congress has barred any
such action by the federal courts. Indeed, he views abstention as a form
of federal common law,92 but the source of the prohibition is not the
Rules of Decision Act. Rather, it is the "detailed and carefully balanced
existing statutory network" 93 of federal question jurisdictional statutes
and section 1983. The jurisdictional statutes constitute a directive to
enforce the substantive program.94 Redish views abstention as a blatant
act of "judicial lawmaking of the most sweeping nature" 95 that both
ignores a congressional directive and undermines an important legis-
lative program. If anything, it is worse than federal common law, in
terms of separation of powers principles. 96 Once again, however, he
does not present those principles as triggered by inherent limitations
on the federal courts but by the presence of dispositive statutes.
Redish's views on abstention are widely discussed in legal
scholarship 97 and appear to have had an impact on the Supreme Court
itself.98 I have developed my own extensive critique of them
elsewhere 99 and will set forth here in brief why I consider his repudia-
tion of abstention unconvincing. Obviously, one must begin with sta-
tutory texts. The mere fact that Congress has enacted jurisdictional
statutes is not dispositive. The federal courts cannot act at all until
Congress has established them and conferred jurisdiction that reaches
a particular case. To analyze abstention it is necessary to analyze the
statutes.
Consequently, one would expect Redish to set forth the relevant
statutes in the text, as he did with the Rules of Decision Act,' 00 and
demonstrate why declining to exercise jurisdiction violates them. At
times he appears to view this as a self-evident proposition, particularly
92. THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 2, at 38.
93. Id. at 48.
94. Id. at 67. One might quibble that § 1983 clearly does not create any substantive
rights. However, it does make certain the availability ofjudicial enforcement of rights derived
from other federal sources, primarily the Constitution.
95. Id. at 55.
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U.L. REV. 543, 544 (1985)
(discussing Professor Redish's article); Wells, Why Professor'Redish is Wrong About Absten-
tion, 19 GA. L. REV. 1097 (1985).
98. See Brown, supra note 23, at 150 (discussing Court's recent insistence that
Younger is narrow exception to general duty to exercise jurisdiction, emphasizing power of
Congress).
99. Id. at 122-32, 140-48.
100. THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 2, at 30.
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when he refers to the statutes as "seemingly unlimited,"' 0 1 as consti-
tuting "dictates,"' 1 2 and as imposing a "duty." 1 3 Is the matter this
clear cut? Section 1331 of Title 28, the general federal question juris-
dictional statute, provides as follows: "The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States."' 1 4 Certainly the word "shall" is
mandatory, a point in Redish's favor,105 but the key term is "jurisdic-
tion." Redish fails to recognize that the concept of jurisdiction has
traditionally included a certain amount of discretion.10 6
Although Redish denies that the relevant jurisdictional and re-
medial statutes are "essentially open-textured," 107 he at times indulges
in his own construction. Thus he finds the term "civil action" suffi-
ciently "ambiguous"08 to allow for doctrines of standing, ripeness and
mootness,10 9 as well as arguably permitting judicial creation of the
doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. "10 He also describes the
Court's extensive body of decisional law on when a case "arises under"
the laws of the United States as representing "constructions of broadly
phrased jurisdictional statutes."II" If statutory phrases such as "civil
actions" and "arising under" leave room for judge-made doctrines of
jurisdiction, why doesn't "jurisdiction" do the same? At the end of his
abstention chapter, Redish admits that it might, but argues that this
would frustrate the clear intent of Congress that federal courts be avail-
able to enforce federal rights. 12 Congress, however, did not use lan-
guage that necessarily forecloses the exercise of judicial discretion. To
turn from the jurisdictional statutes, section 1983 authorizes action at
law and suits "in equity." ' 1 3 The latter term certainly carries with it
an extensive history of discretion. Underlying the statutory scheme is
article III's conferral on the federal courts of the "judicial power."' 114
That term, as well as the relevant statutes, suggests a range of things
that courts can do once vested with jurisdiction. Contrary to Redish's
premise for his abstention analysis, perhaps there is open-texturedness
in the picture after all.
101. Id. at 51.
102. Id. at 47.
103. Id. at 73.
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1986).
105. THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 2, at 173 n.167.
106. Shapiro, supra note 97, at 545-61.
107. THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 2, at 55 (discussing views of Professor Bator).
108. Id. at 64, 66 (emphasis added).
109. Id. at 64.
110. Id. at 66.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 73.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1986).
114. U.S. CONST. art. III.
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If one accepts the argument that the statutory case is not open-
and-shut, a second set of questions arises: whether the exercise of ju-
dicial discretion over jurisdiction can be reconciled with Congress'
power over the federal courts. For Redish the answer is clearly no,
especially given the close relation between the jurisdictional grants and
federal substantive rights. It is possible, however, to view the devel-
opment of federal jurisdiction as an ongoing dialogue between Congress
and the Court.' 5 The dialogue permits judicial resolution of specific
questions that are left open by the broad statutory scheme. The Court's
role goes beyond filling gaps; it participates in making basic policies
about the federal judiciary. Under this view the development of fed-
eralism-based abstention principles is a legitimate limitation on the
exercise of granted jurisdiction, as are other limits that the Court has
developed over the years. 16
Redish rejects this approach for several reasons: the mere fact that
the Court has done this doesn't validate it;" 7 the other limits are not
analogous;'18 Congressional silence should not be viewed as
ratification' 19; and Congress has addressed judicial federalism in the
past.' 20 I think that the notion of a dialogue is more complex than
Redish admits. Let us consider one example: the doctrine of forum
non conveniens. Professor Shapiro cited it as support for discretionary
doctrines such as abstention. 12 1 Redish retorts that it is "largely geo-
graphically, rather than systemically, based."' 122 Even accepting this-
and the doctrine has "public factor" elements that are systemic in a
broad sense' 23-forum non conveniens is'a doctrine under which fed-
eral courts decline to exercise a jurisdiction that Redish has presented
as mandatory. He notes that Congress has codified the doctrine in 28
U.S.C. section 1404,124 and argues that this "underscores the point that,
when Congress wishes the federal judiciary to exercise such broad-based
discretion, it does so by means of an express statutory grant."' 125
What section 1404 authorizes, however, is transfer, not dismissal.
The Supreme Court has held that federal courts retain the power to
dismiss on the nonstatutory forum non conveniens ground. 126 Even
115. See Brown, supra note 23, at 142-43.
116. See generally Shapiro, supra note 97. For an excellent recent development of
the dialogue concept, see Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and
Federal Jurisdiction, 85 Nw. L. REV. 1 (1990).
117. THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 2, at 63.
118. Id. at 63-67.
119. Id. at 53-54.
120. Id. at 53.
121. Shapiro, supra note 97, at 555-57.
122. THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 2, at 65.
123. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6 (1981).
124. THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 2, at 65.
125. Id.
126. Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 235.
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though such dismissals are rarely granted, 27 Redish would have to
argue that they are unconstitutional. Perhaps the Court was wrong after
passage of the statute but, more to the point, why were forum non
conveniens dismissals valid before Congress "codified" the doctrine?
The answer must be that courts had the power to grant them.
In my view, the forum non conveniens example illustrates the
jurisdictional dialogue at work and cuts against Redish's categorical
approach. It also raises again the question of what powers courts possess
inherently when authorized to exercise "jurisdiction," at least until
Congress explicitly takes them away. As I have argued elsewhere, 28
one's views on this question may well reflect the extent to which one
accepts the strict, compartmentalized version of separation of powers
epitomized in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha.129
Redish's citation of Chadha with apparent approval' 30 indicates he
belongs in this camp. The Court, however, has moved away from
Chadha and "bright line" rules' 3 ' toward a more flexible view of sep-
aration of powers. 132 Powers can be shared to some degree; indeed,
there is "a 'twilight area' in which the activities of the separate Branches
merge."1 33 Jurisdictional rules, which are not rules of decision, might
well fall within this area.
Of course, Redish would most likely respond that the relevant
statutes take this power away. Even this statement, however, would be
an admission that the burden is on the critics of abstention rather than
its proponents, a position Redish rejects.'13 We do not know his views
on the fundamental issue of judicial power because he never reaches
it. In the book, Redish promises to approach abstention beginning
"with an analysis of the judiciary's proper role in a democratic soci-
ety."' 35 The analysis tells us that courts must obey valid limits on their
authority. Since Redish never gets beyond statutory issues, the analysis
does not tell us what courts may do if we do not accept his version of
how to read the statute. As with the chapter on federal common law,
I think the book is weakened by not venturing into these deeper waters.
In that context at least, there are hints at constitutional limits, even
127. See J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 91 (1985)
(doctrine retains "only a limited vitality in the federal courts").
128. Brown, supra note 23, at 125-32.
129. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
130. THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 2, at 23.
131. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 586.
132. See generally Brown, supra note 23, at 126-28.
133. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 386 (1989).
134. THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 2, at 51.
135. Id. at 49. This is an example of the somewhat broad claims made for the book.
The cover states that "it calls for a significant restructuring of the relationship between the
federal judiciary and the political branches of the federal government."
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barriers.136 In the abstention context, once the bright lines dim,- the
arguments against the doctrine's legitimacy seem even weaker.
IV. WHY REDISH'S CRITIQUES ARE IMPORTANT
The fact that Redish's particular critiques of federal common law
and of abstention are not convincing as to the illegitimacy of these
doctrines should not lead to the conclusion that these doctrines are
without problems. Redish forces us to focus on questions of legitimacy
in the face of the statutes he cites and, by implication at least, on the
need to move beyond these sources to broader issues of authority and
limits. Serious questions about federal common law and abstention
remain, even if Redish's answers fail.
I shall first consider the questions that remain after Redish's analy-
sis of federal common law. I think the problems are greatest here. The
fact that there is a lot of federal common law on the books does not
validate the enterprise, 37 given the obvious bearing of the Rules of
Decision Act and the Court's suggestions that the Constitution itself
imposes limits. 138 Let us follow Redish and begin with the Act. He is
surely correct in criticizing the Court for "largely ignor[ing] the Act in
fashioning federal common law."' 39 Some members of the Court have
recently directed attention to the' Act's bearing on choice of law in
transfer of cases under section 1404.140 Perhaps that attention will carry
over to the more basic issue of federal lawmaking itself.
The task for the Court would then be to fit federal common law
within the text of the Act. As suggested above,' 4 ' the Court might
develop a construction based on the phrase "where they apply." The
guiding notion would be that there are situations where the logic and
structure of our constitutional system lead to the conclusion that state
law should not apply. The Court could establish principles of non-
applicability along the lines of existing notions such as unique federal
interest or unsuitability of state law. While conceptually appealing,
these principles may be too free-wheeling for the current Court to en-
dorse.
A more likely route for the Court would be to attempt to fit federal
common law under the Act's exception from state law where "the Con-
stitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise
136. Id. at 35, 37.
137. See id. at 63 (arguing against "proof by adverse possession").
138. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 103-04 (1945).
139. THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 2, at 45.
140. Ferens v. John Deere Co., 110 S. Ct. 1274, 1285 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
141. See supra text accompanying note 75.
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require or provide."' 142 One can find the basis for such an approach in
Boyle, an important case that Redish does not discuss. The majority
in Boyle began its analysis by reference to prior holdings:
[A] few areas, involving "uniquely federal interests," are so
committed by the Constitution and laws of the United States
to federal control that state law is pre-empted and replaced,
where necessary, by federal law of a content prescribed (absent
explicit statutory directive) by the courts-so-called 'federal
common law. ' 43
It would not stretch construction "to the breaking point," as Redish
puts it, 144 to apply the Act's reference to "require or provide" for federal
law to the Court's notion of areas "committed" to federal law. Com-
mitment of a subject matter to federal control is, however, a broader
concept than requiring an authorization for judicial lawmaking. If the
Court finds this acceptable statutory construction, let it say so.
In order to apply such a statutory scheme, the Court might invoke
and develop the constitutional values of federalism and separation of
powers, as applied in Erie to federal common law under the Act. Dis-
senting in Boyle, Justice Brennan started down this road.145 Although
he did not cite the Rules of Decision Act, he invoked the traditional
narrowness of federal common law and the need to link it to direct
exercises of congressional power. 146 Sounding like Redish, he de-
nounced the government contractor defense established in Boyle as an
illegitimate exercise of legislative authority. 47
The problem with Justice Brennan's position is that it admits the
validity of some federal common law. Indeed, this reflects a problem
with the Court's position. How do we delimit the confines of valid
federal common law? The importance of Redish's arguments is that
they force the Court to justify the existence of any federal common
law. At the other end of the spectrum, Professor Weinberg's
arguments 148 force the Court to explain why it cannot fashion federal
common law across the board.
Perhaps we will end up with traditional answers such as federal
enclaves, presumption in favor of state law, etc.' 49 There is a certain
irony in the fact that the likely effect of Redish's strongly revisionist
142. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1986).
143. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2514.
144. THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 2, at 36.
145. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2519 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 2524 (ustifying immunity defense by noting that federal officer's authority
comes from statute).
147. Id. at 2528.
148. See supra text accompanying note 46.
149. See Weinberg, supra note 26, at 807-09.
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scholarship will be an extension and reinforcement of current doctrine.
Even this would be a gain, however, and shows the value of an analysis
that focuses on legitimacy. There is something troubling about a case
like Boyle in which the same Court that generally exalts Congress' role
as lawmaker makes important new law on its own, limiting the question
of legitimacy essentially to a discussion of existing precedents without
an explanation of why those precedents are valid.
In addition to the area of federal common law, Redish's critique
of abstention could also have an impact on the courts. Although Re-
dish's critique of abstention is the less problematic of the two areas
and can essentially be answered along the lines suggested above, I be-
lieve that further discussion of his views is merited here. The Court
itself has done little to explain judicial authority to engage in abstention,
apart from its early suggestions that the practice is rooted in equity.'50
In particular, the Court has never justified abstention against the sta-
tutory background on which Redish relies, although dissenting opinions
have seemed to call for such an inquiry. 15 1 The Court's failure to ad-
dress the jurisdictional statutes is surprising since it has stated that
federal courts have a "virtually unflagging" obligation to exercise the
jurisdiction granted them. 152 The Court obviously views abstention as
a legitimate exception to that obligation, but has not elaborated on
whether the source of the discretion is "jurisdiction," "equity" or the
"judicial power" itself.
The Court recently noted the authority issue and suggested that
its source was a mixture of equity and congressional understandings
about judicial discretion with respect to relief.' 53 Redish's work may
already have played a role in bringing the Court to this point. The fact
that the Court itself seems concerned about the legitimacy issue'5 4 is
all the more reason for it to address Redish's statutory critique. Ex-
amining and explaining in detail the source of authority for a doctrine
like Younger would also help the Court develop more coherent limi-
tations on the doctrine than it has been able to do to date. The concept
of "important state interest," for example, has been somewhat elu-
sive.'55 Perhaps, as with the federal common law, we will end up at
more or less the same place as we are now. At least we will know how
we got there. I believe that Redish is wrong in presenting his arguments
150. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
151. See Brown, supra note 23, at 144-45 (discussing opinions of Justices Douglas
and Brennan).
152. Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
817 (1976).
153. New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 109 S. Ct.
2506, 2513 (1989).
154. See Brown, supra note 23, at 150-51.
155. See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
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as unanswerable. I believe that the Court is wrong in not answering
them.
V. A NOTE ON CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION
My focus in this Review is on the "federal courts" portion of The
Federal Courts in the Political Order. Nonetheless, there are obvious
links between this portion and the second half, where Redish discusses
jurisdictional doctrines which affect constitutional adjudication, such
as standing, ripeness and mootness. These doctrines are an important
part of the basic corpus of federal courts law. Moreover, an under-
standing of the nature and role of the federal courts in their noncon-
stitutional capacity ought to have implications here as well.
In the second half of the book, Redish calls for "judicial aggres-
siveness in the exercise of... jurisdiction to interpret and enforce the
counter-majoritarian Constitution against the majoritarian
branches."' 5 6 Thus he calls for "a substantial reduction in the self-
imposed limits on federal judicial power to adjudicate constitutional
challenges."' 57 The general problem with this call for aggressiveness is
that, in the first half of the book, Redish has painted a picture of an
almost subservient judiciary. The emphasis there is on Congress' cen-
tral role: "Well-accepted principles of separation of powers mandate
that an electorally accountable legislature make the basic policy deci-
sions concerning how the nation is to be governed."15 Redish seems
to draw a bright line between the judiciary's constitutional and non-
constitutional roles. Yet the aggressiveness that courts show in the
former context might well carry over to the latter. If the Court cannot
do the lesser activity of common lawmaking, perhaps it should be
reluctant to enter into the greater one of constitutional adjudication.
Let us briefly consider this point in three different contexts.
Suppose the political branches decided to gang up on the judicial
branch and strip the federal courts, including the Supreme Court, of
any meaningful role. Scholars have long debated the extent of limits
on Congress to do this, including limits within article III. 59 Redish
alludes to the debate, 160 and takes the position that the due process
clause limits congressional power to take jurisdiction simultaneously
from the state and federal courts. 161 But what are the limits on Congress'
powers over the federal courts? Redish's insistence on the need for
156. THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 2, at 139 (emphasis added).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 74.
159. See, e.g., Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction:
An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 896-97 (1984).
160. THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 2, at 131.
161. Id.
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vigorous constitutional enforcement suggests a view of the judiciary as
truly equal and coordinate. 162 However, his earlier emphasis on judicial
subservience points toward broad congressional power over the courts
in any capacity.163
A second constitutional issue is how to deal with the concept of
"constitutional common law." The term is that of Professor Monaghan,
who posits a variety of sub-constitutional principles such as remedies
for constitutional violations. 64 The Court derives them from the basic
instrument, but Congress possesses substantial power to change these
results. Redish dismisses the thesis as "oxymoronic."' 65 He writes that
it "turns the principle of separation of powers-under which the un-
representative judiciary acts as a counter-majoritarian check on the
representative branches by enforcing the Constitution-on its head, by
effectively vesting in the representative branches authority to overrule
the judiciary's constitutional judgments."' 166 Once again, bright line
analysis provides the answer for Redish. The Supreme Court, however,
has reached quite a different answer, recognizing a wide range of
congressional power over constitutional remedies. Justice Stevens has
justified this approach, in the context of constitutional remedies against
federal officials, in terms that could come right out of the first half of
Redish's book: "When [a] novel question of policy involves a balancing
of the conflicting interests in the efficient operation of a massive gov-
ernmental program and the protection of the rights of the individual
... I feel very deeply that we should defer to the expertise of Con-
gress."' 167
The third and most important context in which deference to the
legislature as a fundamental value might make a difference is the ex-
ercise of judicial review over substantive congressional legislation. 68
Redish admits that the content of doctrine applied might be deferential
in terms of tending to uphold legislation, 69 but does not accept the
possibility that deference could lead to reluctance to get involved at
all. Consider the matter, however, from the perspective of a Court that
agrees with Redish that Congress makes "the basic policy decisions"
for the nation. Judicial invalidation of a congressional statute, whatever
162. See Amar, supra note 4, at 702 (describing federal courts as "equal and coor-
dinate to Congress," and as "active expounders of public norms rather than passive resolvers
of disputes").
163. Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered- Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary,
36 UCLA L. REV. 233, 295 (1988).
164. Monaghan, Foreword, Constitution Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975).
165. THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 2, at 41.
166. Id.
167. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2528 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
168. I leave to one side the question of judicial review of state legislation.
169. THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 2, at 84.
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provision is its source,'is quite an important policy choice. Congress
cannot change it. The legislative branch's special legitimacy might lead
the Court toward doctrines that give Congress' actions a good deal of
insulation from any judicial review. This is somewhat the position of
the current Court; 170 Redish obviously rejects it.
Rather than drawing bright lines around the components of the
judicial function, Redish might strengthen his call for vigorous asser-
tions ofjudicial power in constitutional cases by accepting the position
that common lawmaking, abstention and constitutional adjudication
are all variants of the same institutional function: the exercise ofjudicial
power. Each aspect of this function draws on the techniques of the
others, and the legitimacy of any one reinforces the legitimacy of the
others. 171 Perhaps Redish could accept this position as a matter of the
inherent nature and role of the federal courts. His failure to reach these
ultimate questions and his insistence that the statutes provide bright
line answers in nonconstitutional areas prevent us from knowing and,
in my view, take away potential support for his constitutional juris-
diction arguments.
Of course it may be that Redish views the Court's role and pro-
cesses in a constitutional case as fundamentally different from what it
does in a common law case. Redish is somewhat ambivalent on this
broad issue. Several of the book's passages point toward differences.
Redish describes the Court as "expositor" of the Constitution. 172 He
refers to the judiciary's "important political role" when it hears con-
stitutional cases. 173 He finds fault with analogies to traditional private
law adjudication, based in part on the fact that constitutional decisions
"generally go well beyond the interests of the individual litigant bring-
ing the suit."174 On the other hand, he recognizes the courts' "special
claim of competence." '75 Do the courts derive this competence solely
from the fact that they are isolated from "majoritarian political influ-
ence"? 176 One could, after all, set up a body of "constitutional pron-
ouncers" with life tenure and other article III protections. At times
Redish suggests that courts are appropriate for the constitutional func-
tion, precisely because they are courts. Thus they are not "merely de-
bating societies."' 177 They cannot issue "free-standing and binding leg-
170. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
171. Under this view, opposition to implied rights of action would rest primarily on
grounds of statutory construction, rather than on a negative approach to federal common
law.
172. THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 2, at 7.
173. Id. at 89, 109.
174. Id. at 94.
175. Id. at 132.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 104.
1991:293
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
islation,"' 178 but must deal with real disputes brought before them for
resolution and in which they can issue orders. 179 "Such limitations
ensure both that the federal judiciary will function as courts and not
as legislatures or executives, while not interfering significantly with
performance of their political role as enforcer of the counter-majori-
tarian constitutional checks."' I80
A conservative might reply that this sounds like such old-fashioned
notions as the rule against advisory opinions, and that some of the
jurisdictional doctrines Redish criticizes are designed to limit courts
to functioning "as courts." My point is that the constitutional part of
the book shows the limits of a bright line analysis in understanding
the whole range of the federal court's activities. Redish posits a "ju-
dicial-political" model of constitutional adjudication,' 8 ' in which "the
federal courts perform their important political role in a judicial man-
ner." ' 82 Perhaps there is nothing inherently wrong, then, with federal
common law in which it might be said that federal courts perform their
inherently judicial functions in a political manner.
VI. OMISSIONS
The Federal Courts in the Political Order is a timely discussion of
important issues. Without detracting from this evaluation, I feel that
it could have been strengthened by more extensive discussion of de-
velopments since publication of the law review articles from which the
book is largely drawn. This is particularly true ofjudicial developments.
A good example is Boyle v. United Technologies, 83 discussed
above in connection with federal common law. Boyle represents the
Supreme Court's most recent and important foray into that doctrinal
jungle. The two main opinions emphasized issues of legitimacy. Redish
could have analyzed Boyle both as an example of the Court's failure
to apply the Rules of Decision Act and as an example of how he would
apply it to an important federal common law case. I would particularly
like to know his views on the Brennan dissent.'8 4 Justice Brennan's
position on federal common law is close to Redish's, albeit without the
Act as guiding star.
In a similar vein, I would have liked to see some discussion of
New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans,185
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 103-05.
182. Id. at 109; see also id. at 103 (referring to "hybrid judicial and political functions
performed in the adjudication of constitutional issues").
183. 108 S. Ct. 2510 (1988).
184. Id. at 2519 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
185. 109 S. Ct. 2506 (1989).
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the Court's 1989 decision on Younger abstention. As noted above, the
Court's analysis of the validity of Younger seems motivated by a need
to respond to the Redish critique. How would he respond to the re-
sponse, particularly to the introduction of remedial discretion 86 as a
possible justification? Finally, he might have addressed the flexible sep-
aration of powers cases. After all, separation of powers lies at the core
of the first half of the book. He cites Chadha with approval, 8 7 but
gives no hint that the recent flexible decisions represent a substantial
departure from its formalistic approach. Redish has criticized this de-
velopment in another law review article, but the reader of the book is
relegated to a footnote reference to that article.' 88
Redish does a better job of incorporating recent academic writing.
His rebuttal to his critics in the areas of federal common law 18 9 and
abstention' 90 makes the book particularly current. There are, however,
other writers, such as Professors Amar and Chemerinsky, discussion
of whose work would have enriched the enterprise. For example, Pro-
fessor Chemerinsky's development of the "litigant choice theory" as
an alternative to current abstention doctrine' 9' receives only footnote
mention. 192 This is surprising given the fact that his views tend to
bolster the Redish critique and the fact that some of the book came
directly from an article responding, in part, to Chemerinsky. 93
As a last note in this category, I found myself wondering how the
Redish critique would apply to other federal courts doctrines. He states
that "[c]onceivably, all jurisdictional doctrine could be tested under
the two precepts I have gleaned from American political theory, with
varying results."' 194 He limits this observation's applicability to a brief
critique of the Court's construction of the diversity jurisdiction stat-
ute. 195 What about the extensive body of "arising under" doctrine on
federal question jurisdiction? These cases might be criticized as undue
deprivation of a federal forum. They might also be explored for limits
on the outer boundaries ofjudicial policymaking authority under broad
statutes.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this Review I have focused on what I have called the "federal
courts" portion of The Federal Courts in the Political Order. I believe
186. Id. at 2513.
187, THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 2, at 23.
188. Id. at 180 n.! 10.
189. Id. at 156 n.26.
190. Id. at 60-67.
191. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 163.
192. THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 2, at 188 n.3.
193. Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: A Comment
on Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Rights, 36 UCLA L. REv. 329 (1988).
194. THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 2, at 138.
195. Id.
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that Redish's discussions of federal common law and federal court
abstention are more challenging and original than those ofjusticiability
doctrines. Redish's thesis is that both federal common law and ab-
stention are illegitimate under basic notions of separation of powers
because Congress has precluded any such judicial activity. His analysis
suffers from two flaws: first, the relevant statutes are by no means as
clear as he portrays them; second, the application of separation of pow-
ers doctrine stops with the notion that courts should obey statutes.
What is lacking is a discussion of more fundamental issues concerning
the federal courts' nature and role in a system of separated, but some-
times shared, powers. Questions abound. What are the inherent powers
of federal courts, and how far do they extend if not limited by Congress?
What differentiates their common law powers from those of state
courts? Does the Constitution, particularly as expounded in Erie, pro-
vide answers? Are there a range of judicial administration issues, such
as discretionary refusals to exercise jurisdiction, where Congress and
the Supreme Court share power? What is the bearing on these issues
of the Court's recent separation of powers cases? Because the book does
not grapple with these issues, I think that Redish's case for a drastic
alteration of existing doctrine is less strong than it might be. Still, he
raises important questions that need to be answered. The Court has
not yet provided those answers, but there are increasing signs that it
might. Grappling with Redish's contentions will be an essential part of
any such enterprise.
